Alexis Waters v. Steven Powell : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
Alexis Waters v. Steven Powell : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Daniel F. Bertch; Bertch Robson; Attorneys for Appellee.
Karra J. Porter; Sarah E. Spencer; Christensen & Jensen; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Waters v. Powell, No. 20090143 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1521
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ALEXIS WATERS, 
Appellee, 
vs. 
STEVEN POWELL, and JOHN DOES, 
Appellant. 
CaseNo.20090143-CA 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER 
OF THE HON. ROBERT ADKINS 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Daniel F. Bertch 
BERTCH ROBSON 
1996 East 6400 South #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Karra J. Porter, 5223 
Sarah E. Spencer, 11141 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
ED 
P A ! i r i T - A 
JUN 222009 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ALEXIS WATERS, 
Appellee, 
vs. 
STEVEN POWELL, and JOHN DOES, 
Appellant. 
CaseNo.20090143-CA 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER 
OF THE HON. ROBERT ADKINS 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Karra J. Porter, 5223 
Sarah E. Spencer, 11141 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Daniel F. Bertch 
BERTCH ROBSON 
1996 East 6400 South #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Attorneys for Appellee 
LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
All parties to the proceedings below are identified in the caption on appeal. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED, PRESERVATION, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 2 
Statement of Undisputed Facts 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 5 
I. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS ESTABLISH THAT CITY PET CLUB 
AND WATERS ARE "KEEPERS" UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 
18-1-1 '..5 
II. KEEPERS ARE PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING IN STRICT 
LIABILITY AS AGAINST AN OWNER OR ANOTHER KEEPER 
UNDER THE DOG BITE STATUTE 8 
CONCLUSION
 ; 11 
ADDENDUM 
Amended Order denying summary judgment, January 26,2009 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Armstrong v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Company, 202 Wis.2d 258, 
549 N.W.2d 723 (Wis. 1996) 7 
Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913 (Utah 1998) 1 
Khamis v. Everson, 88 Ohio App.3d 220,623 N.E.2d 683 (Ohio App. 1993) 7,10 
Lewis v. Chovan, 2006 WL 1681400 (Ohio App. 2006) 7 
Murphy v. Buonato, 679 A.2d 411 (Conn. App. 1996) 8, 9 
Neztsosie v. Meyer, 883 P.2d 920 (Utah 1994) 6, 7 
Priebe v. Nelson, 39 Cal.4th 1112,140 P.3d 848 (Cal. 2006) 10 
Salisbury v. Ferioli, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 485, 730 N.E.2d 373 (2000) 8,10 
Tschida v. Berdusco, 462 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. App.1990) 8 
Wilcoxen v. Paige, 174 Ill.App.3d 541, 528 N.E.2d 1104 (111. App. 1988) 7,10 
STATUTES 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22-357 9 
Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1 1, 2, 6, 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 1 
ii 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
Jurisdiction prior to transfer from the Utah Supreme Court was proper under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED, PRESERVATION, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred in failing to rule on the undisputed facts 
that Waters was a "keeper" under Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1? 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in defendant/appellant Powell's 
motion for summary judgment (R. 36-40.) 
Standard of review: The proper interpretation and application of a statute is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah 
1998). 
Issue 2: Whether a "keeper" under Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1 may assert a strict 
liability cause of action against an "owner" of a dog under that section. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in defendant/appellant Powell's 
motion for summary judgment (R. 36-40.) 
Standard of review: The interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah 1998). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1: 
Every person owning or keeping a dog shall be liable in damages for injury 
committed by such dog, and it shall not be necessary in any action brought 
therefore to allege or prove that such dog was of a vicious or mischievous 
disposition or that the owner or keeper therof knew that it was vicious or 
mischievous; but neither the state nor any county, city, or town in the state nor 
any peace officer employed by any of them shall be liable in damages for 
injury committed by a dog when: (1) The dog has been trained to assist in law 
enforcement, and (2) the injury occurs while the dog is reasonably and 
carefully being used in the apprehension, arrest, or location of a suspected 
offender or in maintaining or controlling the public order. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This is an action for personal injuries involving a dog bite. Plaintiff Alexis Waters 
filed suit against Steven Powell on July 13, 2007, setting forth as her sole cause of action a 
strict liability claim under Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1 (the "dog bite statute"). (R. 1-4.) 
On August 14, 2008, defendant Powell moved for summary judgment, arguing that, 
under case law in Utah and other jurisdictions interpreting similar dog bite statutes, a kennel 
employee such as Waters falls under the statutory category of "keeper," and therefore 
cannot recover under the strict liability statute. The court denied defendant Powell's motion 
for summary judgment without identifying its grounds. (R. 85.)1 
1
 An earlier order denying the motion was signed by the court, but was defective in that it 
was not served on the undersigned counsel as required by U.RXiv.P. 7. The error was 
corrected, and the court entered the Amended Order at issue on January 26,2009. 
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Defendant Powell petitioned for leave to file an interlocutory appeal, which this 
Court granted on March 11,2009. 
Statement of Undisputed Facts2 
1. On March 4, 2005, at the time of the incident in question, Waters was 
employed as the kennel manager at City Pet Club, a day care and boarding kennel located in 
the Salt Lake valley. (R. 35 U 1; R. 44, p. 5:21-25; R. 45, p. 6:l-7.)3 
2. As the kennel manager, it was Waters' responsibility to direct the facility by 
managing the other staff, process incoming dogs, as well as to ensure the safety and 
cleanliness of the dogs in the facility. (R. 35 % 2; R. 45, p. 6:10-15.) 
3. It was also Waters' responsibility to feed the dogs, take them to the bathroom, 
exercise them in the play areas, and keep certain dogs segregated in the play areas. (R. 35 f 
3; R. 45, pp. 6:17-25,7:3-7, 8:4-7.) 
4. On March 4,2005, Defendant Steven Powell brought his dog "Snoop" to City 
Pet Club to be boarded for several days. (R. 36 % 4; R. 45, p. 9:13-15.) 
5. While Waters was introducing Snoop to other dogs in the play area, Snoop 
lunged after one of the other dogs. (R. 36 f^ 5; R. 46, p. 11:1-8.) 
The facts were based upon Waters' own deposition testimony, and were uncontroverted. 
Paragraphs 1-7 are taken from Powell's Memorandum in Support of his Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 35-36), and were not disputed by Waters (R. 58-59). Paragraphs 
8-10 are taken from Waters' Memorandum in Opposition to Powell's Motion (R. 59), 
which Powell did not dispute for purposes of his motion, and from Waters' deposition. 
Although the briefing on Powell's motion for summary judgment stated that the bite 
occurred on March 5, 2005, Waters' Complaint and deposition both allege that the bite 
took place on March 4,2005, which is the date used herein. 
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6. Waters intervened and grabbed hold of Snoop by the "scruff," the hair on the 
back of the dog's neck. (R. 3616; R. 46, p. 11:7-10.) 
7. Waters then attempted to remove Snoop from the play area and away from 
the other dogs, which she was motivated to do out of safety concerns for all of the dogs. 
Snoop lunged a second time toward another dog. Waters then pulled back on Snoop's 
scruff, at which point Snoop turned and bit Waters on her thigh. (R. 36 f 7; R. 46, p. 12:1-
11.) 
8. Waters testified in her deposition that "Snoop had a history of being 
overexcited or aggressive" in the open play area with other dogs. On previous visits, Snoop 
had been aggressive toward other dogs. (R. 36 U 9; R. 46, pp. 10:9-12,14:3-25,15:1-13.) 
9. Prior to March 4, 2005, Waters had told Powell that Snoop had acted 
aggressively toward other dogs. (R. 36f 10; R. 46, p. 15:12-18.) 
10. Waters did not testify that she had ever observed or heard of Snoop exhibiting 
any aggression toward a human being. (R. 44-52 (Waters deposition, passim).) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The legal issues involved in this case are narrow, and the case law from other 
jurisdictions is particularly one-sided. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that, although 
it is difficult to frame an overall definition of "keeper," the concept contemplates persons 
who "assume[e] custody, management, and control" of a dog, caring for the dog similarly to 
an owner. 
In this case, Waters and City Pet Club accepted (for payment) the responsibility to 
board and care for Snoop over a period of several days. Waters' responsibilities as kennel 
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manager included feeding, tending, and ensuring the safety and cleanliness of the dog - in 
short, duties very similar to those performed by an owner. In similar circumstances, 
courts in other jurisdictions have consistently held that an employee of a kennel or 
veterinarian's office is a keeper for purposes of a dog bite statute. 
Once Ms. Waters is recognized as a keeper, she is precluded from recovering 
under the strict liability statute. As other courts have recognized, such statutes are 
intended to protect a different class of individuals, i.e., third parties who have no control 
over a dog's behavior. Additionally, because the statute imposes strict liability equally 
against both "keepers" and "owners," a contrary interpretation would permit co-owners to 
sue each other, and owners to sue keeper for injuries from their own dogs. 
In short, the plain language, structure, and policy considerations underlying the 
strict liability dog bite statute preclude Ms. Waters, Snoop's keeper, from suing Mr. 
Powell, Snoop's owner. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS ESTABLISH THAT CITY PET 
CLUB AND WATERS ARE "KEEPERS" UNDER UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 18-1-1. 
Whether a kennel and boarding facility, and a "kennel manager" employee of such a 
facility, meet the statutory definition of a "keeper" under Utah's strict liability dog bite 
statute are questions of first impression in Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1 provides: 
Every person owning or keeping a dog shall be liable in damages for injury 
committed by such dog, and it shall not be necessary in any action brought therefor 
to allege or prove that such dog was of a vicious or mischievous disposition or that 
the owner or keeper thereof knew that it was vicious or mischievous;... 
5 
As the Utah Supreme Court has recognized, the term "keeper" as used in Section 18-
1-1 contemplates an undertaking to "manage, control, or care for" a dog: 
We hold that the term "keeper," as it is used in section 18-1-1, means more than 
merely checking to see if a dog has sufficient food and water for a limited time. It is 
difficult to frame a universal definition of keeper, but the assumption of custody, 
management, and control is intrinsic to the definition. The term implies the exercise 
of a substantial number of the incidents of ownership by one who, though not the 
owner, assumes to act in his stead.. . . One becomes the keeper of a dog only when 
he, either with or without the owner's permission, undertakes to manage, control, or 
care for it as dog owners in general are accustomed to. 
Neztsosie v. Meyer, 883 P.2d 920,921 (Utah 1994). 
The undisputed facts in this case show that both Waters and City Pet Club met the 
definition of "keeper" as used in Section 18-1-1 and elucidated upon in Neztsosie. City Pet 
Club was a pet kennel open to the public for the specific purpose of housing (for 
compensation) dogs for boarding and day care services. It is undisputed that Waters was 
acting in the course and scope of her employment as kennel manager at the time of the bite. 
As mentioned above, Snoop was placed in the care of Waters and City Pet Club for a 
several-day period. Waters' responsibilities included: 1) handling intake of dogs into City 
Pet Club, 2) feeding the dogs boarded in City Pet Club, 3) cleaning up after the dogs and 
maintaining cleanliness in their surroundings, 4) ensuring the dogs' safety, 5) taking the 
dogs for bathroom breaks, 6) exercising the dogs in the designated play areas, and 7) 
breaking up fights between dogs and preventing the dogs from biting one another. (See 
Statement of Facts fflf 2-3, 7.) Hence, Waters was bitten while grabbing Snoop's scruff in 
an effort to drag him away from other dogs at which he was allegedly lunging, and while 
attempting to separate him from the other dogs. 
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Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Waters as the nonmoving party, 
these undisputed facts establish that City Pet Club and Waters, by virtue of her employment 
responsibilities as kennel manager, had assumed the "incidents of ownership" of Snoop at 
the time of the bite, and "undercook] to manage, control, or care for [the dog] as dog 
owners in general are accustomed to." Neztsosie, 883 P.2d at 921. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion, holding that a 
kennel, veterinary, or groomer employee who undertakes responsibilities to care for, 
control, feed, or clean up after a dog, falls within the definition of a "keeper" as that term is 
used in dog bite statutes. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Company, 
202 Wis.2d 258, 267 549 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Wis. 1996) (kennel employee fell under 
Wisconsin statutory definition of keeper where she "perform[ed] certain duties which 
included letting the dog out to exercise, cleaning its pen, and supplying it with water[,]" and 
"was in the process of caring for and (at least attempting to) exercise control over Mandy 
[the dog] at the time she was bitten[.]"); Khamis v. Everson, 88 Ohio App.3d 220, 222, 623 
N.E.2d 683, 684 (Ohio App. 1993) (worker at Harrison Kennels, whose "tasks involved 
changing the hay and water in each dog's cage, leaving food for the dogs, and ensuring that 
each dog returned to his cage," and who was attempting to return dog to cage while bitten, 
fell under statutory definition of keeper under Ohio's dog bite strict liability statute); Lewis 
v. Chovan, 2006 WL 1681400 (Ohio App. 2006) (unpublished) (employee of pet grooming 
establishment held to be "keeper" under dog bite strict liability statute); Wilcoxen v. Paige, 
174 Ill.App.3d 541, 543, 528 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (111. App. 1988) (proprietor of dog 
boarding and grooming business fell within statutory definition of "owner" under Illinois 
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dog bite statute); Tschida v. Berdusco, 462 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. App.1990) (owner not liable 
under Minnesota strict liability dog bite statute when dog bit veterinarian's employee 
because owner and veterinarian were statutory owners); Salisbury v. Ferioli, 49 
Mass.App.Ct. 485, 730 N.E.2d 373, 377 (2000) (veterinarian's assistant was a "keeper" as a 
matter of law under dog bite statute). 
The reasoning of these courts is sound, and as a matter of law, Ms. Waters falls 
under the definition of a "keeper" as that term is used in Utah's dog bite strict liability 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1. 
II. KEEPERS ARE PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING IN 
STRICT LIABILITY AS AGAINST AN OWNER OR 
ANOTHER KEEPER UNDER THE DOG BITE STATUTE. 
Section 18-1-1 states that "[e]very person owning or keeping a dog shall be liable in 
damages for injury committed by such dog[.]" As explained above, Waters is a "keeper" 
under that provision. Accordingly, under the statute's plain language, she is strictly liable 
for her own damages. As other courts have recognized, because keepers are not within the 
class of persons intended to be protected under strict liability statutes, and because keepers 
remain strictly liable for their own injuries, the keeper of a dog who is bitten may not 
recover as against another keeper or an owner. 
In Murphy v. Buonato, 679 A.2d 411 (Conn. App. 1996), for example, the court 
ruled that the statutory keeper of a dog could not recover under Connecticut's strict liability 
dog bite statute. After first holding that the plaintiff was a "keeper" under the statute, the 
appellate court then addressed whether a keeper would be permitted to recover under 
Connecticut's similar dog bite statute, which stated, in relevant part, "if any dog does any 
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damage . . . the owner or keeper[] . . . shall be liable for such damage . . . " Id. at 413 n.l, 
citing Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22-357.4 
The Murphy court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to bring herself within the 
protections of the strict liability statute. "[T]he clear meaning of § 22-357 is that either the 
owner or keeper of a dog shall be strictly liable for injuries caused by that dog solely to third 
parties," the court stated. "[W]e hold that a keeper of a dog is not within the class of 
persons that the legislature intended to protect by enacting § 22-357." Id. at 418. 
Adopting the plaintiffs construction of the statute "would lead to bizarre results 
insofar as the statute would then allow suits not only between keepers and owners, but also 
between owners and coowners," the court observed. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court has been 
similarly blunt in rejecting the notion that keepers may recover under a strict liability dog 
bite statute, stating: 
If we were to read the statute as appellant would have us read it, then absurd 
consequences could follow. For example, if two people owned, kept, or harbored a 
dog which bit one of them, then the person bitten could sue his co-owner, co-keeper, 
or co-harborer. 
4
 The Murphy court ruled that keeper status was met under these facts: "On the evening 
before his departure, the defendant delivered the dog to the plaintiff, at the plaintiffs 
residence, and provided the plaintiff with dog food and a chain to secure the dog in the 
plaintiffs yard. The defendant instructed the plaintiff not to allow the dog to roam. The 
plaintiff took possession of the dog upon its delivery and, in doing so, assumed sole 
responsibility to feed and water it, to provide shelter for it, and to walk it. Furthermore, on 
the day he was bitten, it was the plaintiff who had tied the dog to a tree, later untied it and 
took hold of its collar to prevent the dog from running away. In short, the subordinate 
facts found by the trial court established that the plaintiff not only harbored the dog by 
affording it lodging and shelter, but also exercised exclusive dominion and control over 
it." Id. at 415. 
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Also, consider the situation where an owner leaves Ms dog at a kennel with the 
intention of keeping it there for a lengthy period of time, and who comes to the 
kennel periodically to visit the dog. If the dog bites his owner on one of the visits, 
then the owner, under appellant's interpretation of the statute, would be permitted to 
sue the kennel as "keeper" or "harborer" for his injuries under the strict liability 
statute. We do not believe that the legislature intended for [Ohio's strict liability dog 
bite statute] R.C. 955.28 to be construed in a manner that would lead to the foolish 
results we have outlined above. 
Khamis, supra, 623 N.E. 2d at 687; see also Salisbury, 730 N.E.2d at 377 (as a "keeper," 
veterinarian's assistant could not recover against dog owner under strict liability dog bite 
statute; "One involved in custody of a dog for medical care seems a most unlikely plaintiff 
under a statute intended for the benefit of outsiders who are unable to protect themselves 
from injury by dogs"); Wilcoxen, 528 N.E.2d at 1106 (proprietor of dog boarding and 
grooming business barred from bringing action against dog's owner following bite because 
proprietor fell within statutory definition of "owner" under Illinois dog bite statute, and 
could not recover because a person accepting responsibility for controlling animal cannot 
maintain cause of action for injuries resulting from failure to control animal); Priebe v. 
Nelson, 39 Cal.4th 1112, 140 P.3d 848 (Cal. 2006) ("veterinarian's rule" barred kennel 
employee's statutory strict liability claim against owner for injuries from dog bite while the 
employee was caring for the dog at the kennel; from a public policy standpoint, a dog owner 
would not be held strictly liable under the statute for the routine risk of dog bite injuries 
suffered by a trained and paid professional). 
The plain language of the statute, the intent behind the statute, and the policies 
underlying the statute all compel the same conclusion in this case. As a matter of law, the 
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keeper of a dog may not recover from an owner under Utah's strict liability dog bite statute, 
and the trial court should have granted defendant Waters' motion for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, defendant/appellant Steven Powell respectfully 
requests the Court reverse the trial court's denial of summary judgment, and remand with 
instructions for the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the defendant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisP?Qp( day of June, 2009. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Karra J. Porter 0 U 
Sarah E. Spencer 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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EST THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
ALEXIS WATERS, 
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vs. 
STEVEN POWELL, and JOHN DOES 8-V, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED ORDER 
Civil No. 070411996 
Judge Robert Adkins 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on the Motion of Defendant for Summary 
Judgment. The Court, having reviewed the memoranda filed in support of and opposition to the 
respective motions, and set the matter for hearing on October 28, at 8:30 a.m. Now, therefore, the 
Court ORDERS as follows: 
1. The summary judgment motion of Defendant is DENIED. 
DATED this e(L day of January, 2009. 
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